The prenucleolus and the reduced game property: Equal treatment replaces anonymity

Gooni Orshan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

In his paper, Sobolev [1975] characterized the prenucleolus as the unique solution concept, defined over the class of cooperative games that satisfies single valuedness, anonymity, covariance under strategic equivalence and reduced game property (consistency). In this paper we show that anonymity can be weakened and replaced by a requirement of equal treatment (symmetry).

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)241-248
Number of pages8
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume22
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1993

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