The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

Emilio Calvo*, J. Javier Lasaga, Eyal Winter

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

44 Scopus citations

Abstract

The principle of balanced contributions has appeared repeatedly in the literature on the Shapley value. This principle is akin to the reciprocity properties shared by almost all cooperative solution concepts. We provide a new axiomatization for the level structure value. This axiomatization has the advantage that it can be applied to many important subdomains of TU games. We use the Hart-Mas-Colell potential function as a tool to prove our main result, and establish another interesting characterization for the value as a by-product.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)171-182
Number of pages12
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Volume31
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1996

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful for the constructive suggestions made by two anonymous referees, which helped us improve an earlier version of this paper. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Universidad del Pals Vasco (proyecto UPV 036.321-HA127/93).

Keywords

  • Balanced contributions
  • Level structures
  • Potential function
  • Shapley value
  • TU games

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this