The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

Emilio Calvo; J. Javier Lasaga; Eyal Winter

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3

The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

Emilio Calvo^*, J. Javier Lasaga, Eyal Winter

^*Corresponding author for this work

Department of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

45 Scopus citations

Abstract

The principle of balanced contributions has appeared repeatedly in the literature on the Shapley value. This principle is akin to the reciprocity properties shared by almost all cooperative solution concepts. We provide a new axiomatization for the level structure value. This axiomatization has the advantage that it can be applied to many important subdomains of TU games. We use the Hart-Mas-Colell potential function as a tool to prove our main result, and establish another interesting characterization for the value as a by-product.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	171-182
Number of pages	12
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	31
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3
State	Published - 1996

Bibliographical note

Funding Information:
We are grateful for the constructive suggestions made by two anonymous referees, which helped us improve an earlier version of this paper. The authors acknowledge financial support from the Universidad del Pals Vasco (proyecto UPV 036.321-HA127/93).

Keywords

Balanced contributions
Level structures
Potential function
Shapley value
TU games

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10.1016/0165-4896(95)00806-3

Cite this

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abstract = "The principle of balanced contributions has appeared repeatedly in the literature on the Shapley value. This principle is akin to the reciprocity properties shared by almost all cooperative solution concepts. We provide a new axiomatization for the level structure value. This axiomatization has the advantage that it can be applied to many important subdomains of TU games. We use the Hart-Mas-Colell potential function as a tool to prove our main result, and establish another interesting characterization for the value as a by-product.",

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AU - Winter, Eyal

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The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation

Abstract

Bibliographical note

Keywords

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