TY - JOUR
T1 - The Procedural Nature of Moral Standing
AU - Herstein, Ori J.
AU - Malcai, Ofer
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 The Author(s).
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - Norms of standing are puzzling. Your friend asks you for a favor. In the past, that same friend has failed to grant you similar requests. It seems that under such conditions, you are allowed to disregard your friend's request as a reason for granting it, on the grounds that he lacked standing to make the request. Yet, given that friends' requests are reason-giving, your license to disregard that (valid) reason is mysterious. We aim to dispel this sense of mystery by conceptualizing standing norms as procedural norms. Procedural norms are second-order (outcome-neutral) norms about how to engage with other norms. And norms of standing are a particular type of procedural norm, namely procedural exclusionary permissions. More generally, understanding standing norms as part of the "procedural branch"of morality exemplifies how the interplay between substance and procedure can clarify and demystify certain puzzles of moral discourse.
AB - Norms of standing are puzzling. Your friend asks you for a favor. In the past, that same friend has failed to grant you similar requests. It seems that under such conditions, you are allowed to disregard your friend's request as a reason for granting it, on the grounds that he lacked standing to make the request. Yet, given that friends' requests are reason-giving, your license to disregard that (valid) reason is mysterious. We aim to dispel this sense of mystery by conceptualizing standing norms as procedural norms. Procedural norms are second-order (outcome-neutral) norms about how to engage with other norms. And norms of standing are a particular type of procedural norm, namely procedural exclusionary permissions. More generally, understanding standing norms as part of the "procedural branch"of morality exemplifies how the interplay between substance and procedure can clarify and demystify certain puzzles of moral discourse.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=105005745202&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/s1352325225000084
DO - 10.1017/s1352325225000084
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AN - SCOPUS:105005745202
SN - 1352-3252
JO - Legal Theory
JF - Legal Theory
ER -