The Procedural Nature of Moral Standing

Norms of standing are puzzling. Your friend asks you for a favor. In the past, that same friend has failed to grant you similar requests. It seems that under such conditions, you are allowed to disregard your friend's request as a reason for granting it, on the grounds that he lacked standing to make the request. Yet, given that friends' requests are reason-giving, your license to disregard that (valid) reason is mysterious. We aim to dispel this sense of mystery by conceptualizing standing norms as procedural norms. Procedural norms are second-order (outcome-neutral) norms about how to engage with other norms. And norms of standing are a particular type of procedural norm, namely procedural exclusionary permissions. More generally, understanding standing norms as part of the procedural branch of morality exemplifies how the interplay between substance and procedure can clarify and demystify certain puzzles of moral discourse.