TY - JOUR
T1 - The Questionable Efficiency of the efficient-breach doctrine
AU - Lewinsohn-Zamir, Daphna
PY - 2012/3
Y1 - 2012/3
N2 - The doctrine of efficient breach is based on the belief that the risk of postcontractual bargaining failure under property rules is greater than the risk of the courts' miscalculation of damages under liability rules. The article presents the findings of two experiments that challenge this belief and suggest that courts systematically undercompensate promisees. Implementation of the efficient-breach doctrine might therefore lead to underdeterrence and inefficiency
AB - The doctrine of efficient breach is based on the belief that the risk of postcontractual bargaining failure under property rules is greater than the risk of the courts' miscalculation of damages under liability rules. The article presents the findings of two experiments that challenge this belief and suggest that courts systematically undercompensate promisees. Implementation of the efficient-breach doctrine might therefore lead to underdeterrence and inefficiency
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84857551483&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1628/093245612799440014
DO - 10.1628/093245612799440014
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AN - SCOPUS:84857551483
SN - 0932-4569
VL - 168
SP - 5
EP - 26
JO - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
IS - 1
ER -