The scientific untraceability of phenomenal consciousness

Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


It is a common conviction among philosophers who hold that phenomenal properties, qualia, are distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional properties, that it is possible to trace the neural correlates of these properties. The main purpose of this paper is to present a challenge to this view, and to show that if "non-cognitive" phenomenal properties exist at all, they lie beyond the reach of neuroscience. In the final section it will be suggested that they also lie beyond the reach of psychology, so that they may be said to lie beyond the reach of science.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)509-529
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophia (United States)
Issue number4
StatePublished - Dec 2008
Externally publishedYes


  • Consciousness
  • NCC
  • Neural correlate
  • Non-cognitivism
  • Phenomenal consciousness
  • Phenomenism
  • Qualia
  • The neural correlate of consciousness


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