Abstract
The feasible set in a Nash bargaining game is a set in the utility space of the players. As such, its points often represent expectations on uncertain events. If this is the case, the feasible set changes in time as uncertainties resolve. Thus, if time for reaching agreement is not fixed in advance, one has to take into account options for delaying an agreement. This paper studies such games and develops a solution concept which has the property that its followers will always prefer to reach an immediate agreement, rather than wait until a new feasible set arises.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 163-193 |
| Number of pages | 31 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue number | 3-4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Sep 1981 |