The transparency of experience and the neuroscience of attention

Assaf Weksler*, Hilla Jacobson, Zohar Z. Bronfman

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


According to the thesis of transparency, subjects can attend only to the representational content of perceptual experience, never to the intrinsic properties of experience that carry this representational content, i.e., to “mental paint.” So far, arguments for and against transparency were conducted from the armchair, relying mainly on introspective observations. In this paper, we argue in favor of transparency, relying on the cognitive neuroscience of attention. We present a trilemma to those who hold that attention can be directed to mental paint. Such attention is either first-order sensory, higher-order cognitive, or higher-order sensory attention. We argue that the notion of first-order sensory attention to mental paint is incompatible with the neuroscience of sensory attention; that higher-order cognitive attention to mental paint is irrelevant to transparency; and that the notion of higher-order sensory attention to mental paint has an apparently incoherent prediction. Via elimination, these considerations support the thesis of transparency.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)4709-4730
Number of pages22
Issue number5
StatePublished - May 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer Nature B.V.


  • Mental paint
  • Neuroscience of attention
  • Phenomenism
  • Representationalism
  • Transparency of experience


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