The vertical restraints paradox: Justifying the different legal treatment of price and non-price vertical restraints

Ittai Paldor*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Over the past fifty years anti-trust theorists and economists have advanced several pro-competitive explanations for minimum resale price maintenance, or.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)317-353
Number of pages37
JournalUniversity of Toronto Law Journal
Volume58
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2008

Keywords

  • Customer allocation
  • Non-price competition
  • Territorial exclusivity
  • Vertical restraints

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