The vertical restraints paradox: Justifying the different legal treatment of price and non-price vertical restraints

Ittai Paldor

doi:10.3138/utlj.58.3.317

The vertical restraints paradox: Justifying the different legal treatment of price and non-price vertical restraints

Ittai Paldor^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Law

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Over the past fifty years anti-trust theorists and economists have advanced several pro-competitive explanations for minimum resale price maintenance, or.

Original language	American English
Pages (from-to)	317-353
Number of pages	37
Journal	University of Toronto Law Journal
Volume	58
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3138/utlj.58.3.317
State	Published - 2008

Keywords

Customer allocation
Non-price competition
Territorial exclusivity
Vertical restraints

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10.3138/utlj.58.3.317

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abstract = "Over the past fifty years anti-trust theorists and economists have advanced several pro-competitive explanations for minimum resale price maintenance, or.",

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The vertical restraints paradox: Justifying the different legal treatment of price and non-price vertical restraints

Abstract

Keywords

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