Theorizing regulatory intermediaries: The rit model

Kenneth W. Abbott*, David Levi-Faur, Duncan Snidal

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

123 Scopus citations

Abstract

Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). We set out an agenda for the study of regulation as a three- (or more) party relationship, with intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, from monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets to building communities of assurance and trust. After developing the basic regulator- intermediary-target (RIT) model, we discuss important extensions and variations of the model. We then discuss the varieties of regulatory capture that may appear where intermediaries are involved.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)14-35
Number of pages22
JournalAnnals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Volume670
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 2017

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, SAGE Publications Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords

  • Capture
  • Intermediaries
  • Orchestration
  • Regulation
  • Regulatory governance
  • Rule-makers
  • Rule-takers

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