Abstract
Derek Parfit held that in evaluating the future, we should ignore the difference between necessary persons and merely possible persons. In this article, I look at one of the most prominent alternatives to Parfit's view, namely Michael Otsuka and Larry Temkin ‘shortfall complaints’ view. In that view, we aggregate future persons’ well-being and deduct intrapersonal shortfall complaints, giving extra weight to the complaints of necessary persons. I offer here a third view. I reject Parfit's no difference view in that I register a difference between necessary and possible persons. But I also reject the Shortfall View and replace its intra-personal complaints with an inter-personal complaints mechanism. I argue that the value of a population is its aggregate prioritarian value minus the egalitarian complaints that necessary persons hold. I show that the egalitarian view has all the explanatory power of the Shortfall view in easy cases, while significantly improving on it in three sorts of tough cases.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 154-180 |
Number of pages | 27 |
Journal | Politics, Philosophy and Economics |
Volume | 23 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - May 2024 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s) 2023.
Keywords
- Michael Otsuka
- egalitarianism
- population ethics
- prioritarianism
- shortfall complaints