Tradable patent rights

Ian Ayres*, Gideon Parchomovsky

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

32 Scopus citations

Abstract

Patent thickets may inefficiently retard cumulative innovation. This Article explores two alternative mechanisms that may be used to weed out patent thickets. Both mechanisms are intended to reduce the number of patents in our society. The first mechanism we discuss is price-based regulation of patents through a system of increasing renewal fees. The second and more innovative mechanism is quantity-based regulation through the establishment of a system of Tradable Patent Rights. The formalization of tradable patent rights would essentially create a secondary market for patent permits in which patent protection will be bought and sold. The Article then discusses how price and quantity regulation can be combined to effect superior weeding.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)863-894
Number of pages32
JournalStanford Law Review
Volume60
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2007
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Tradable patent rights'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this