Transparency and incentives among peers

Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

This article studies the effect of transparency among peers on the principal's cost of providing incentives. Using directed graphs to represent peer information, we show that under complementarity the cost of providing incentives is decreasing with the level of transparency within the organization. We also investigate the role of the architecture of the information in boosting incentives. In arguing that substitution impedes the benefits of transparency, we will compare function-based teams with process-based teams, showing that the latter are more effective in providing incentives.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)504-523
Number of pages20
JournalRAND Journal of Economics
Volume41
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Transparency and incentives among peers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this