TY - GEN
T1 - Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
AU - Lehmann, Daniel
AU - O'Callaghan, Liaden Ita
AU - Shoham, Yoav
PY - 1999
Y1 - 1999
N2 - Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms - in particular, their truth revelation properties - assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method, which has empirically been shown to perform well. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players. We demonstrate the latter property by identifying sufficient conditions for a combinatorial auction to be truth-revealing, conditions which have applicability beyond the specific auction studied here.
AB - Some important classical mechanisms considered in Microeconomics and Game Theory require the solution of a difficult optimization problem. This is true of mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, which have in recent years assumed practical importance, and in particular of the gold standard for combinatorial auctions, the Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). Traditional analysis of these mechanisms - in particular, their truth revelation properties - assumes that the optimization problems are solved precisely. In reality, these optimization problems can usually be solved only in an approximate fashion. We investigate the impact on such mechanisms of replacing exact solutions by approximate ones. Specifically, we look at a particular greedy optimization method, which has empirically been shown to perform well. We show that the GVA payment scheme does not provide for a truth revealing mechanism. We introduce another scheme that does guarantee truthfulness for a restricted class of players. We demonstrate the latter property by identifying sufficient conditions for a combinatorial auction to be truth-revealing, conditions which have applicability beyond the specific auction studied here.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0010248861&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/336992.337016
DO - 10.1145/336992.337016
M3 - ???researchoutput.researchoutputtypes.contributiontobookanthology.conference???
AN - SCOPUS:0010248861
SN - 1581131763
SN - 9781581131765
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 96
EP - 102
BT - Proceedings of the 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 1999
T2 - 1st ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 1999
Y2 - 3 November 1999 through 5 November 1999
ER -