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Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions
Daniel Lehmann
*
, Liadan Ita O'Callaghan
, Yoav Shoham
*
Corresponding author for this work
The Rachel and Selim Benin School of Engineering and Computer Science
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peer-review
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Keyphrases
Combinatorial Auctions
100%
Optimization Problem
75%
Vickrey Auction
50%
Payment System
25%
Exact Solutions
25%
Game Theory
25%
Optimization Methods
25%
Natural Properties
25%
Greedy Optimization
25%
Microeconomic Theory
25%
Computer Science
Combinatorial Auction
100%
Optimization Problem
75%
Payment Scheme
25%
Gold Standard
25%
Assume Property
25%
Mathematics
Approximates
100%
Gold Standard
50%
Psychology
Scheme
100%
Game Theory
50%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Auction
100%
Payment Scheme
14%
Gold Standard
14%
Microeconomic Theory
14%