Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions

Ahuva Mu'alem*, Noam Nisan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review

107 Scopus citations

Abstract

When attempting to design a truthful mechanism for a computationally hard problem such as combinatorial auctions, one is faced with the problem that most efficiently computable heuristics can not be embedded in any truthful mechanism (e.g. VCG-like payment rules will not ensure truthfulness). We develop a set of techniques that allow constructing efficiently computable truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the special case where only the valuation is unknown by the mechanism (the single parameter case). For this case we extend the work of Lehmann O'Callaghan, and Shoham, who presented greedy heuristics, and show how to use IF-THEN-ELSE constructs, perform a partial search, and use the LP relaxation. We apply these techniques for several types of combinatorial auctions, obtaining truthful mechanisms with provable approximation ratios.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages379-384
Number of pages6
StatePublished - 2002
Event18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), 14th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference (IAAI-02) - Edmonton, Alta., Canada
Duration: 28 Jul 20021 Aug 2002

Conference

Conference18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-02), 14th Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference (IAAI-02)
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityEdmonton, Alta.
Period28/07/021/08/02

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