Abstract
We design two computationally-efficient incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with general bidder preferences. Both mechanisms are randomized, and are incentive-compatible in the universal sense. This is in contrast to recent previous work that only addresses the weaker notion of incentive compatibility in expectation. The first mechanism obtains an O(√m)-approximation of the optimal social welfare for arbitrary bidder valuations - this is the best approximation possible in polynomial time. The second one obtains an O(log2 m)-approximation for a subclass of bidder valuations that includes all submodular bidders. This improves over the best previously obtained incentive-compatible mechanism for this class which only provides an O(√m)-approximation.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | STOC'06 |
Subtitle of host publication | Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) |
Pages | 644-652 |
Number of pages | 9 |
ISBN (Print) | 1595931341, 9781595931344 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2006 |
Event | 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06 - Seattle, WA, United States Duration: 21 May 2006 → 23 May 2006 |
Publication series
Name | Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing |
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Volume | 2006 |
ISSN (Print) | 0737-8017 |
Conference
Conference | 38th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC'06 |
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Country/Territory | United States |
City | Seattle, WA |
Period | 21/05/06 → 23/05/06 |
Bibliographical note
Funding Information:We thank Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Uri Feige, Ron Lavi, Ahuva Mu’alem, and Chaitanya Swamy for helpful discussions and comments. The second author is supported by a grant from the Israeli Academy of Sciences. The third author is supported by NSF grant 0331548. The work was partially done when the first and third authors were in the Hebrew University and were supported by a grant from the Israeli Academy of Sciences. A preliminary version of this paper appeared in STOC’06.
Keywords
- Combinatorial Auctions
- Incentive Compatibility