Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority

Tal Rabin*, Michael Ben-Or

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

724 Scopus citations

Abstract

Under the assumption that each participant can broadcast a message to all other participants and that each pair of participants can communicate secretly, we present a verifiable secret sharing protocol, and show that any multiparty protocol, or game with incomplete information, can be achieved if a majority of the players are honest. The secrecy achieved is unconditional and does not rely on any assumption about computational intractability. Applications of these results of Byzantine Agreement are also presented. Underlying our results is a new tool of Information Checking which provides authentication without cryptographic assumptions and may have wide applications elsewhere.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationProc Twenty First Annu ACM Symp Theory Comput
PublisherPubl by ACM
Pages73-85
Number of pages13
ISBN (Print)0897913078, 9780897913072
DOIs
StatePublished - 1989
EventProceedings of the Twenty First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing - Seattle, WA, USA
Duration: 15 May 198917 May 1989

Publication series

NameProc Twenty First Annu ACM Symp Theory Comput

Conference

ConferenceProceedings of the Twenty First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing
CitySeattle, WA, USA
Period15/05/8917/05/89

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