Voting and vetoing

Eyal Winter*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

59 Scopus citations

Abstract

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the appro ach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)813-823
Number of pages11
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Volume90
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1996

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