Voting for policy, not parties: How voters compensate for power sharing

Orit Kedar*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Book/ReportBookpeer-review

81 Scopus citations

Abstract

This book proposes an institutionally embedded framework for analyzing voter choice. Voters, Orit Kedar argues, are concerned with policy, and therefore their vote reflects the path set by political institutions leading from votes to policy. Under this framework, the more institutional mechanisms facilitating post-electoral compromise are built into the political process (e.g., multi-party government), the more voters compensate for the dilution of their vote. This simple but overlooked principle allows Kedar to explain a broad array of seemingly unrelated electoral regularities and offer a unified framework of analysis, which she terms compensatory vote. Kedar develops the compensatory logic in three electoral arenas: parliamentary, presidential, and federal. Leveraging on institutional variation in the degree of power sharing, she analyzes voter choice, conducting an empirical analysis that brings together institutional and behavioral data in a broad cross section of elections in democracies.

Original languageAmerican English
PublisherCambridge University Press
Number of pages224
ISBN (Electronic)9780511657481
ISBN (Print)9780521764575
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2009
Externally publishedYes

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© Orit Kedar 2009 and Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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