Voting in cooperative information agent scenarios: Use and abuse

Jeffrey S. Rosenschein*, Ariel D. Procaccia

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

3 Scopus citations


Social choice theory can servo as an appropriate foundation upon which to build cooperative information agent applications. There is a rich literature on the subject of voting, with important theoretical results, and builders of automated agents can benefit from this work as they engineer systems that reach group consensus. This paper considers the application of various voting techniques, and examines nuances in their use. In particular, we consider the issue of preference extraction in these systems, with an emphasis on the complexity of manipulating group outcomes. We show that a family of important voting protocols is susceptible to manipulation by coalitions in the average case, when the number of candidates is constant (even though their worst-case manipulations are NP-hard).

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationCooperative Information Agents X - 10th International Workshop, CIA 2006. Proceedings
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)354038569X, 9783540385691
StatePublished - 2006
Event10th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2006 - Edinburgh, United Kingdom
Duration: 11 Sep 200613 Sep 2006

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume4149 LNAI
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Conference10th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents, CIA 2006
Country/TerritoryUnited Kingdom


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