Voting with interdependent values: The Condorcet winner

Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Xianwen Shi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We generalize the standard, private values voting model with single-peaked preferences and incomplete information by introducing interdependent preferences. Our main results show how standard mechanisms that are outcome-equivalent and implement the Condorcet winner under complete information or under private values yield starkly different outcomes if values are interdependent. We also propose a new notion of Condorcet winner under incomplete information and interdependent preferences, and discuss its implementation. The new phenomena in this paper arise because different voting rules (including dynamic ones) induce different processes of information aggregation and learning.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)193-208
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume142
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2023

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 Elsevier Inc.

Keywords

  • Condorcet winner
  • Incomplete information
  • Interdependent values
  • Sequential voting

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