Weakly-acyclic (Internet) routing games

Roee Engelberg*, Michael Schapira

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

9 Scopus citations

Abstract

Weakly-acyclic games - a superclass of potential games - capture distributed environments where simple, globally-asynchronous interactions between strategic agents are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We explore the class of routing games in [4, 12], which models important aspects of routing on the Internet. We show that, in interesting contexts, such routing games are weakly acyclic and, moreover, that pure Nash equilibria in such games can be found in a computationally efficient manner.

Original languageAmerican English
Title of host publicationAlgorithmic Game Theory - 4th International Symposium, SAGT 2011, Proceedings
Pages290-301
Number of pages12
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Externally publishedYes
Event4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2011 - Amalfi, Italy
Duration: 17 Oct 201119 Oct 2011

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6982 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference4th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2011
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityAmalfi
Period17/10/1119/10/11

Keywords

  • Weakly-acyclic games
  • best-response dynamics
  • convergence to Nash equilibrium
  • routing games

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