TY - GEN
T1 - Welfare maximization in congestion games
AU - Blumrosen, Liad
AU - Dobzinski, Shahar
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Congestion games are non-cooperative games where the utility of a player from using a certain resource depends on the total number of players that are using the same resource. While most work so far took a game-theoretic approach to this problem, we study centralized solutions for congestion games from a computational point of view. We analyze the computational complexity of the welfare-maximization problem, and provide both approximation algorithms and lower bounds. Throughout the paper, different kinds of congestion effects (externalities) among the players are considered: positive, negative, and unrestricted. Our main algorithmic result is a constant approximation algorithm for congestion games with unrestricted externalities. We describe an important and useful connection between congestion games and combinatorial auctions. This connection allows us to use insights and methods from the combinatorial-auction literature for solving congestion games. Finally, we initiate the study of strategic centralized mechanisms in congestion-game environments.
AB - Congestion games are non-cooperative games where the utility of a player from using a certain resource depends on the total number of players that are using the same resource. While most work so far took a game-theoretic approach to this problem, we study centralized solutions for congestion games from a computational point of view. We analyze the computational complexity of the welfare-maximization problem, and provide both approximation algorithms and lower bounds. Throughout the paper, different kinds of congestion effects (externalities) among the players are considered: positive, negative, and unrestricted. Our main algorithmic result is a constant approximation algorithm for congestion games with unrestricted externalities. We describe an important and useful connection between congestion games and combinatorial auctions. This connection allows us to use insights and methods from the combinatorial-auction literature for solving congestion games. Finally, we initiate the study of strategic centralized mechanisms in congestion-game environments.
KW - Approximation Algorithms
KW - Combinatorial Auctions
KW - Congestion Games
KW - Welfare Maximization
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33748699105&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/1134707.1134714
DO - 10.1145/1134707.1134714
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AN - SCOPUS:33748699105
SN - 1595932364
SN - 9781595932365
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
SP - 52
EP - 61
BT - Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006
PB - Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
T2 - 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Y2 - 11 June 2006 through 15 June 2006
ER -