Abstract
Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response.
| Original language | American English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Fittingness |
| Subtitle of host publication | Essays in the Philosophy of Normativity |
| Editors | Christopher Howard, R. A. Rowland |
| Place of Publication | Oxford |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| Number of pages | 80 |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191916380 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780192895882 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Oct 2022 |