Abstract
One of the reasons for the lack of agreement about the normative justification of toleration is the unclarity of the concept of toleration itself. The aim of this chapter is to try to distinguish it from its many cognate concepts with which it is often associated. Some of them are cognitive in character (skepticism, relativism); some are pragmatic (coexistence, compromise); and others are psychological (restraint, indulgence), moral (charity, considerateness), or political (state neutrality, value pluralism). Subjecting these closely associated concepts to the formal conditions of toleration (objection, power to intervene, accommodation, reason for restraint, suffering) demonstrates that none of these cognate concepts can be distinctly identified as toleration. This leaves us with a very restricted concept of toleration which is more moral than political, personal rather than impersonal, and supererogatory rather than a duty or a right.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration |
Publisher | Springer International Publishing |
Pages | 53-70 |
Number of pages | 18 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9783030421212 |
ISBN (Print) | 9783030421205 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 1 Jan 2021 |
Bibliographical note
Publisher Copyright:© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022.
Keywords
- Accommodation
- Respect for rights
- Skepticism
- Supererogation
- Toleration