What Toleration Is Not

David Heyd*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

One of the reasons for the lack of agreement about the normative justification of toleration is the unclarity of the concept of toleration itself. The aim of this chapter is to try to distinguish it from its many cognate concepts with which it is often associated. Some of them are cognitive in character (skepticism, relativism); some are pragmatic (coexistence, compromise); and others are psychological (restraint, indulgence), moral (charity, considerateness), or political (state neutrality, value pluralism). Subjecting these closely associated concepts to the formal conditions of toleration (objection, power to intervene, accommodation, reason for restraint, suffering) demonstrates that none of these cognate concepts can be distinctly identified as toleration. This leaves us with a very restricted concept of toleration which is more moral than political, personal rather than impersonal, and supererogatory rather than a duty or a right.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationThe Palgrave Handbook of Toleration
PublisherSpringer International Publishing
Pages53-70
Number of pages18
ISBN (Electronic)9783030421212
ISBN (Print)9783030421205
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2021

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022.

Keywords

  • Accommodation
  • Respect for rights
  • Skepticism
  • Supererogation
  • Toleration

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