When queueing is better than push and shove

Alex Gershkov*, Paul Schweinzer

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end, we consider individually rational and balanced budget direct and indirect mechanisms. We show that this class of mechanisms allows us to form efficient queues provided that existing property rights for the service are small enough to enable trade between the agents. In particular, we show on the one hand that no queue under a fully deterministic service schedule such as first-come, first-serve can be dissolved efficiently and meet our requirements. If, on the other hand, the alternative is full service anarchy then every existing queue can be transformed into its efficient order.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)409-430
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number3
StatePublished - Jul 2010


  • Mechanism design
  • Queueing
  • Scheduling


Dive into the research topics of 'When queueing is better than push and shove'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this