When Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings

Sophia Zhengzi Li, Ernst Maug*, Miriam Schwartz-Ziv

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper analyzes how trading after shareholder meetings changes the composition of the shareholder base. Analyzing daily trades, we find that mutual funds reduce their holdings if their votes are opposed to the voting outcome. Trading volume is high even when stock prices do not change, peaks on the meeting date, and remains high up to four weeks after shareholder meetings. The results support models based on differences of opinion that predict that shareholders' beliefs may diverge more after observing voting outcomes. Hence, trading after meetings creates a more homogeneous shareholder base, which has important implications for corporate governance.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)1813-1867
Number of pages55
JournalReview of Financial Studies
Volume35
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Apr 2022

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

Keywords

  • G11
  • G12
  • G14
  • G30
  • G40

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