Which moral properties are eligible for perceptual awareness?

Preston J. Werner*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology.

Original languageAmerican English
Pages (from-to)290-319
Number of pages30
JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
Issue number3
StatePublished - 2020

Bibliographical note

Publisher Copyright:
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020


  • Evaluative properties
  • Moral epistemology
  • Moral perception
  • Normative properties
  • Perception
  • Perceptual awareness


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