Yodel is the first system for voice calls that hides metadata (e.g., who is communicating with whom) from a powerful adversary that controls the network and compromises servers. Voice calls require sub-second message latency, but low latency has been difficult to achieve in prior work where processing each message requires an expensive public key operation at each hop in the network. Yodel avoids this expense with the idea of self-healing circuits, reusable paths through a mix network that use only fast symmetric cryptography. Once created, these circuits are resilient to passive and active attacks from global adversaries. Creating and connecting to these circuits without leaking metadata is another challenge that Yodel addresses with the idea of guarded circuit exchange, where each user creates a backup circuit in case an attacker tampers with their traffic. We evaluate Yodel across the internet and it achieves acceptable voice quality with 990 ms of latency for 5 million simulated users.
|Original language||American English|
|Title of host publication||SOSP 2019 - Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles|
|Publisher||Association for Computing Machinery, Inc|
|Number of pages||14|
|State||Published - 27 Oct 2019|
|Event||27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP 2019 - Huntsville, Canada|
Duration: 27 Oct 2019 → 30 Oct 2019
|Name||SOSP 2019 - Proceedings of the 27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles|
|Conference||27th ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, SOSP 2019|
|Period||27/10/19 → 30/10/19|
Bibliographical noteFunding Information:
Thanks to Robert Morris, Phil Levis, Tej Chajed, the anonymous reviewers, and our shepherd, Brad Karp, for providing feedback that improved this paper. This work was supported by NSF awards CNS-1413920 and CNS-1414119. David Lazar is supported by an SOSP 2019 student scholarship from the National Science Foundation.
© 2019 David Lazar, Yossi Gilad, Nickolai Zeldovich.