Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

Jean Pierre Ponssard; Shmuel Zamir

doi:10.1007/BF01737562

Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

Jean Pierre Ponssard^*, Shmuel Zamir

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

14 Scopus citations

Abstract

Repeated zero-sum two-person games of incomplete information on one side are considered. If the one-shot game is played sequentially, the informed player moving first, it is proved that the value of the n-shot game is constant in n and is equal to the concavification of the game in which the informed player disregards his extra information. This is a strengthening of Aumann and Maschler's results for simultaneous games. Optimal strategies for both players are constructed explicitly.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	99-107
Number of pages	9
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	2
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737562
State	Published - Dec 1973
Externally published	Yes

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abstract = "Repeated zero-sum two-person games of incomplete information on one side are considered. If the one-shot game is played sequentially, the informed player moving first, it is proved that the value of the n-shot game is constant in n and is equal to the concavification of the game in which the informed player disregards his extra information. This is a strengthening of Aumann and Maschler's results for simultaneous games. Optimal strategies for both players are constructed explicitly.",

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Zero-sum sequential games with incomplete information

Abstract

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